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Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS DARWIN DIRKS
AND JACQUELYN DIRKS IN ANSWER TO
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS' APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
There are two main issues presented for review.

First,

shall this Court overrule its previous holdings in Jeffs v. Citizens
Finance Company, 319 P.2d 858 (Utah 1958) and Wiscombe v. Lockhart
Co., 608 P.2d 236 (Utah 1980) where it held that in cases such

1

as the one at bar, it was up to the one who took an interest
in a real estate contract

(the Defendants Goodwills, here) as

pledge for a loan to seek out and determine the status of his
assignor's rights and obligations?

Second, does the mere existence

of statutes which regulate Quiet Title Actions and

Mortgage

Foreclosures and the provision by the state of a neutral court
system

to settle private disputes involving

land

constitute

state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONSr STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
The Due Process Clause in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution states, " [N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law;, . . ."
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures states
in appropriate part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding

is a Quiet Tiule Action wherein all

defendants have been eliminated except the Defendants-appellants
Wilford w. Goodwill and Dorothy P. Goodwill.

Record at 120-122.

Judge Ronald 0. Hyde of the Second Judicial District Court granted
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Plaintiffs-Respondents Darwin Dirks and Jacquelyn Dirks1 Motion
For Summary Judgment against the Goodwills.

Record at 103-104.

The following facts are relevant to the issues presented
for review:
On June 10, 1977, Alma S. Butler and his wife, Wanda
R. Butler, purchased
Approximately

a year

a piece of real property

in Roy, Utah.

later, on May 15, 1978, the Butlers sold

that property to Paul S. Cornwell and Catherine L. Cornwell
on a Uniform Real Estate Contract.

The Cornwells recorded a

Buyer's Notice of Contract on May 16, 1978.

Record at 59.

The Cornwells failed to make their payments as required
by the contract and on February 17, 1981, the Butlers notified
the Cornwells that the Cornwells were in default on their Uniform
Real Estate Contract and on March 4, 1981, the Butlers sent
a Notice of Default and Cancellation of Contract to the Cornwells.
This Notice was recorded on March 12, 1981.

Record at 59.

On March 3, 1980, the Cornwells executed a trust deed
on this property

in favor of Stewart Title Company of Ogden

as trustee and Wilford W. Goodwill and Dorothy P. Goodwill as
beneficiaries.

This trust deed was for the purpose of securing

payment of a promissory note in the sum of $38,000.00.
recorded on April 3, 1980.

It was

Record at 60, 89.

The Butlers were unaware when they sent the Notice
of Default and Cancellation of Contract that the Cornwells had
executed

the trust deed.

The Butlers did not become aware of
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the existence of this Trust Deed until approximately March 20,
1981.

Record at 60.
On March 23, 1981, the Butlers conveyed the property

to Darwin Dirks and Jacquelyn Dirks, the plaintiffs in the Quiet
Title Action.

Record at 60.

It must be noted that Plaintiffs disagree with some
of the statements contained
Facts.

Statement of

First, Goodwills assert several times that a foreclosure

proceeding was involved
is not true.
under

in the Defendants 1

at some point

in this action.

This

The Butlers repossessed the property in question

the terms of a Uniform Real Estate Contract, not in a

foreclosure proceeding.
included

Record at 59, 62, 64.

Second, Defendants

some statements as facts when they are clearly not

facts but arguments, e.g., that Goodwills had a right to notice
and a hearing before Butlers repossessed the property.

Defendants1

brief at page 4.
Finally, Defendants assert in their Statement of Facts
at page 3 of their brief that they (the Goodwills) had a security
interest
true.

in the property in question of $38,000.

This is not

While it is a fact that Goodwills loaned their assignors,

Cornwells, $38,000, Cornwells had only about $9,000 equity in
the Uniform Real Estate Contract which they signed with the
Butlers.

Since the assignee can take no more

interest than

his assignor had, Goodwills had no more than $9,000 security
interest in the property.

4

An examination of the Uniform Real Estate Contract
executed by the Butlers and the Cornwells reveals that the purchase
price paid by the Cornwells for the property was $71,000 with
$8,000 being paid down and the $63,000 balance plus 9-1/4% interest
to be paid at the rate of $506.92 each month, beginning July
1, 1978.

Record at 61.

These figures reveal that less than

$25.00 per month of the $506.92 payment was applied to the principal.

The Cornwells paid on this contract from July 1, 1978

until March 3, 1980, a total of 21 payments, before using this
contract to secure their loan from the Goodwills.
60, 61, 89.

Record at

Therefore, on March 3, 1980, when the Cornwells

executed their trust deed with the Goodwills, the Cornwells 1
equity in the Uniform Real Estate Contract was less than $9,000.
Even if Cornwells had paid the $5,000 lump sum payment which
the contract required

to be paid on November 15, 1979 (which

they did not), their equity would have been less than $14,000.
This is a far cry from the $38,000 which Goodwills now claim
as their lost security interest.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is compelling precedent

in this

jurisdiction

to affirm the lower court's order granting plaintiffs 1
for Summary Judgment.

motion

The 1958 case of Jeffff v_«_ Citizens Finance

Company, 319 P.2d 858 (Utah 1958), and the 1980 case of Wiscombe
v. Lockhart Co. , 608 P.2d 236 (Utah 1980), invplved fact situations
almost

identical to the one at bar.

In both cases this Court

held that it was up to the purchaser's assignee

5

(the Goodwills

here) to seek out the vendor

(the Butlers) and offer to fulfill

his assignor's obligations under the Uniform Real Estate Contract
if he wanted to preserve his interest in that contract.
the Goodwills did not do this, they have no further
in the contract.

Since

interest

Other state supreme courts have reached similar

conclusions.
The requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause do not apply

in the instant case.

They apply

only to state action and there was absolutely no state action
involved in this case where private parties repossessed
private property from other private parties under
of a private contract without

invoking

their

the terms

the aid or assistance

of any state official.
In situations such as the one at bar, not involving
racial discrimination, the mere existence of statutes regulating
Quiet Title Actions and Mortgage Foreclosures and the provision
by the state of a neutral court system to settle private disputes
is not sufficient state involvement to constitute state action
for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.

Numerous courts have so

held.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE GOODWILLS HAVE NO RIGHT TO NOTICE AND A HEARING.
A.

Case Law Places

the Burden of Notification

the Goodwills.

6

on

This case presents a situation wherein the vendors
(Butlers, Plaintiffs Dirks1 grantors) conveyed their real property
to the purchasers (Cornwells) on a Uniform Real Estate Contract,
the purchasers failed to comply with paragraphs 15 and
the contract, and the vendors declared
to repossess the property
Unbeknown

16 of

a default and elected

in accordance with paragraph

16A.

to the vendors, prior to the default, the purchasers

had executed a trust deed to the property
securing a promissory note.

for the purpose of

The beneficiaries of the trust

deed (Goodwills) are the Defendants in the Quiet Title proceeding.
Record at 59, 60.
Since there is no genuine issue as to any of the material
facts, the Dirks are entitled to have the lower court's order
granting

them Summary Judgment affirmed ij^ the law as applied

to these facts so indicates.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

Rule 56 (c) .
This Court has dealt with similar situations in the
past.

A 1958 case involved a proceeding that closely parallels

the one at bar.

Jeffs v. Citizens Finance Company, 319 P.2d

858 (Utah 1958) .

In that instance, a vendor sold the property

which was the subject of the quiet title action to a purchaser
on a Uniform Title Retaining Real Estate Contract.
then borrowed

The purchaser

a sum of money from the defendant in the action

and assigned the contract to the defendant for the purpose of
securing

the loan.

The defendant recorded the assignment but

apparently did not inform the vendor of that fact.
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The vendor

then sold her

interest

in the property to another party who

became the plaintiff in the Quiet Title Action.
This new owner had no actual knowledge of the assignment
to the defendant.

The purchasers then became delinquent

under

the terms of the contract and the new owner obtained a default
judgment in accordance with the terms of the contract and took
possession.

When the new owner became aware of the assignment

made by the purchaser, he initiated the Quiet Title Action.
In affirming the lower Court's decision to quiet title
in the new owner, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Under such circumstance [where the assignment was
for the purpose of securing a loan], if the lender
wishes to protect his loan after his assignor defaults
on the real estate contract, it is essential that
he [the lendor (the Goodwills in our case)] make a
tender of full and unqualified performance with respect
to those provisions uncomplied with by the assignor
[the Cornwells in our case].
Jeffs v. Citizens Finance Company, Id.
In the

instant case, as in Jeffs, the lender

(the

Goodwills) did not make a tender of full and unqualified performance
before the purchasers (the Cornwells) defaulted on their contract
obligations, or ever.
The Court went on to state:
Where no tender of unqualified performance is made,
there is no duty on the part of the seller of the
real estate to recognize any interest asserted Dy
such assignee, since the seller at least is entitled
to performance. . . .
In our opinion it is no answer
to say that giving r.otice to the seller, either actual
or constructive, places the burden on him to seek
out one with whom he had no dealing, and volunteer
facts so that an assignee of a real estate contract
securing a loan may elect whether to perform the real

8

estate contract or not. . . . Requiring diligence
on the part of the one holding a real estate contract
securing a loan, under a sort of pledge, to seek out
and determine the status of his assignor's contractual
rights and obligations by way of request, discovery
procedure or otherwise, and to require him to make
a tender of full performance which his assignor has
failed to effectuate does not seem to us to place
an unreasonable burden on the lender who desires to
protect the consideration for which the contract was
assigned or pledged. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 859.
Thus, under the holding of this case, it was up to
the Goodwills, the beneficiaries of a trust deed given for the
purpose of securing a loan, to seek out the Butlers and to determine
the status of the Cornwells 1

contractual obligations and to

make a tender of full performance to the Butlers when the Cornwells
defaulted

on their contract.

This, the Goodwills failed to

do, and so cannot be heard now to claim an interest in the real
property which secured their loan.
In a 1980 case, the Utah Supreme Court confirmed its
adherence to the reasoning and decision it made in the above-cited
case.
1980).

Wiscombe v. The Lockhart Company, 608 P.2d
This case also

is quite similar

236

(Utah

to the one at bar.

The vendor sold some real property by a Uniform Real Estate
Contract to the purchaser, the purchaser defaulted on the contract
by failing

to make an annual payment, and the vendor sent the

purchaser a Notice of Default.
his default, the vendor

When the purchaser did not remedy

respossessed the property.

Unbeknown

to the vendor, the purchaser, prior to his default, had executed
and delivered

to the lender/assignee a promissory note secured
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in part by an assignment of all of his rights, title, and interest
in the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
The Court affirmed the lower court's decision quieting
title in the vendors as against the assignee.

In so doing,

it stated:
Fundamental to the law of assignments is the concept
that an assignee takes nothing more by his assignment
that his assignor had. . . . Beardall [the purchaser]
quit the premises in question on or before February
7, 1977, and so certainly after February 7, the Uniform
Real Estate Contract had no further viability of its
own. Title to the property remained in Wiscombe [the
vendor] no longer subject to the Contract.
(Footnote
omitted).
Wiscombe v. The Lockhart Company, Id. at 238.
The Court went on to hold that the fact that Lockhart
(the lender/assignee) had recorded its assignment from Beardall
(the purchaser) on November 5, 1976, did not obligate Wiscombe
(the vendor) to recognize Lockhart's interest in the property.
The Court stated:
Lockhart places great emphasis on the fact that its
Assignment was recorded and hence gave constructive
notice to Wiscombe of the existence of the Assignment
citing Jeffs v. Citizen's Finance Co. Lockhart argues
there was a duty on the part of Wiscombe to recognize
the interest of Lockhart as an assignee of Beardall's
interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
This reliance by Lockhart on Jeffs is misplaced.
In fact, Jeffs supports the decision of the District
Court. We there stated:
". . .In our opinion, it
is no answer to say that giving notice to the seller,
either actual or constructive, places the burden on
him to seek out one with whom he had no dealing, and
volun+-per fa^ts so that the assignee of a real estate
contract securing a loan may elect whether to perform
the real estate contract or not. Such notice at best
would alert the seller to the fact, that upon performance
by the purchaser or his assignee, the seller would
have a duty to execute a conveyance. Requiring diligence
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on the part of one holding a real estate contract
securing the loan, under a sort of pledge, to seek
out and determine the status of its assignor's contractual
rights and obligations by way of request . . . or
otherwise • . . does not seem to us to place an unreasonable burden on the lender who desires to protect the
consideration for which the contract was assigned
or pledged." (Emphasis in original)
Id.
Applying

the reasoning

and holding

of Wiscombe to

the case at bar leads to the conclusion that after Cornwells
defaulted

on their obligation under the Uniform Real Estate

Contract on March 4, 1981, and Butlers repossessed the property
in accordance with paragraph 16A of that contract, then Cornwells
had no more interest in the property and since Goodwills can
have no more interest than the persons they took from, the Cornwells,
Goodwills have had no interest in the property that is the subject
of the quiet title action since March 4, 1981.
Goodwills recorded their trust deed on April

The fact that

3, 1980, did not

give Butlers notice of Goodwills' interest in the property and
did not obligate Butlers to seek the Goodwills out to see if
the Goodwills wanted to perform the real estate contract in
place of the Cornwells.

Therefore, Goodwills' interest in this

property was terminated on March 4, 1981, and they have no right,
title, or interest in the property at this time.

If Goodwills

wanted to have an opportunity to perform Cornwells' obligations
under the contract to the Butlers, it was up to the Goodwills
to seek out the Butlers and offer to perform.

It was not the

Butlers' responsibility to notify the Goodwills, whose existence
they were unaware of, that Cornwells had defaulted.
11

In their brief, at page 14, the Goodwills

attempt

to negate the impact of Wiscombe v. The Lockhart Company, Id.,
on their case by finding a factual difference between
the case at bar.

it and

They state,

Approximately three weeks after the foreclosure, the
mortgagor assigned his interest to the Lockhart Company
. . . The present case is factually distinguishable
from Wiscombe. More specifically, the Goodwills obtained
their security interest before the foreclosure took
place. • • •
Goodwills have misread Wiscombe.
purchaser

In Wiscombe, the

(Beardall) assigned his interest in the Uniform Real

Estate Contract to Lockhart almost two months before he (Beardall)
defaulted and the vendor (Wiscombe) repossessed the property.
The $15,000 payment due on January 1, 1977, was not
received by Wiscombe.
By Notice of Default dated
January 31, 1977, and served on Beardall on February
2, 1977, Wiscombe gave Beardall five days in which
to remedy his default. Beardall did not do so and
quit the premises on or before February 7, 1977.
Unknown to Wiscombe, Beardall had on November 5, 1976,
executed and delivered to Lockhart a promissory note
secured in part by an Assignment of Contract whereby
Beardall assigned to Lockhart all of his rights, title
and interest in and to the Uniform Real Estate Contract
of January 1, 1976. Lockhart subsequently recorded
the Assignment. (Emphasis added.)
Wiscombe v. The Lockhart Company, Id., at 237.
Thus, it is apparent that in Wiscombe, as in the case
at bar, the purchaser assigned his interest

in the property

to another well before the repossession, or foreclosure as Goodwills
call it, took place.

The facts in Wiscombe are virtually identical

to the facts in this case and Wiscombe mandates that this Court
affirm the lower court's Summary Judgment Order
Dirks.
12

in favor of

Other

state supreme courts have agreed

that

it is

not the responsibility of the vendor to seek out the defaulting
purchaser's assignee or mortgagee
opportunity to cure the default.

in order to provide him an

A 1969 case from Washington

state involved an action by the representative of the deceased
vendor to quiet title to the real property covered by a forfeitable
real

estate

contract

and

to

recover

possession

of

property. Kendrick v. Davis, 452 P.2d 222 (Wash. 1969).

the
The

vendor had sold two parcels of property under a real estate
contract to the purchasers, who twice assigned
in the property to a finance company.

their

interest

The finance company,

the assignee-mortgagee, recorded its interest in the property,
and later the purchasers ceased making payments.

The vendors

then sent a Notice of Declaration of Forfeiture and Cancellation
of Contract to the purchasers.
The lower court held

for the assignee-mortgagee but

the Supreme Court of Washington, sitting en banc, reversed and
found for the vendors.

In so doing, it stated:

An instrument may in form be a deed or an assignment,
but, if the intent is to use the property as security,
it will be a mortgage. . . . The question presented,
therefore, is whether the existence of such mortgages
will render ineffective the vendor's declaration of
forfeiture given to the purchasers alone.
Kendrick v. Davis, Id. at 226.
The Court went on to summarize the case in a manner
that makes it apparent that it is very similar
bar.

It stated:
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to the one at

Simply stated, we have this case (1) a valid forfeitable
real estate contract property recorded; (2) a purchaser
in default; (3) a vendor declaring a forfeiture according
to the contract terms; and (4) a mortgagee of the
purchaser who is unknown to the vendor, but whose
security interest is properly recorded.
Id. at 227.
The Court then stated that the real issue in the case was whether
the duty of giving notice was on the vendor or the mortgagee.

The court resolved this issue by holding that:
The burden is on the mortgagee to notify the vendor
of his interest in the contract.
No undue burden
is thus placed on the mortgagee as he would have actual
knowledge both of the identify of the vendor and of
the vendor's right to declare a forfeiture of the
contract upon the purchaser's default.
(Emphasis
added.)

The Court

then addressed

the

issue of whether

the

recording of the mortgages gave constructive notice of their
existence to the vendor.

The Court stated:

But the recording of the mortgages did not give
constructive notice of their existence to the vendor
who was an antecedent in the chain of title.
The
recording of an instrument is constructive notice
only to those parties acquiring interests subsequent
to the filing and recording of the instrument. The
recording of an instrument does not constitute notice
to antecedents in the chain of title. (Emphasis added.)
Id.at 228*
The Court summarized its holding by stating:
Defendants [the assignee-mortgagee], having failed
to give plaintiff [the vendor] notice of their mortgagee
interests, were not entitled to receive a notice of
the forefeiture. The contract was forfeited in accordance
with its terms and there is no purchaser's interest
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r e m a i n i n g in t h e r e a l t y upon which
(mortgagees') claim can a t t a c h .

the

assignees1

Id.
Another

state supreme court has reached

a similar

conclusion to the ones reached by the Utah and Washington Supreme
Courts.

In a recent New Mexico case, a vendor sold a parcel

of real property to the purchasers under a real estate contract.
Shindledecker

v. Savage, 627 P.2d

1241

(N.M. 1981).

Later,

the purchasers used their interest in the property for the purpose
of securing several loans in return

for which they gave what

was called a "second mortgage" on the property. When the purchasers
decided to move from the state, they conveyed the property back
to the vendor.

There was no evidence that the purchasers were

in default on their contract.
The vendor

then resold the property and the creditor

brought an action to have her "mortgage" declared

superior to

the claims of others and to have it foreclosed.

The Supreme

Court of New Mexico declared

that the creditor did not have

a true second mortgage on a fee interest but only a mortgage
on the vendee's

(purchaser's) equitable interest.

In upholding

the lower court's refusal to recognize and foreclose the creditor's
mortgage, the court stated:
By virtue of his mortgage, the mortgagee obtains the
original purchaser's right to purchase the property
for the consideration stated in +-he purchase contract.
In other words, the mortgagee assumes the rights of
the vendee under the real estate contract.
Shindledecker v. Savage, Id. at 1243.
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The court then held that even though the mortgagee
had the right to assume the purchaser's position under the contract,
his rights must yield to the rights of the subsequent purchasers
of the property.

In explaining this holding, the Court stated:

The mortgagee of an equitable interest must protect
his lien by giving notice to the vendor of his equitable
interest so that he can arrange an assumption of the
contract in case the vendee defaults or otherwise
rescinds the contract.
Recording the mortgage does
not give the vendor constructive notice such as to
require the vendor to notify the mortgagee of his
i n t e n t to r e t a k e t h e p r o p e r t y .
(Citation
omitted). (Emphasis added)
Id.
Two other courts have held

in analagous

situations

that junior lien holders' rights can be cut off without giving
the junior lien holder notice and an opportunity to be heard.
In a case involving

the constitutional validity of

a section of the Georgia code which allowed the holder of legal
title to property that had been given to him as security for
payment of a debt to reduce the debt to judgment after default
in the payment and then quit claim the legal title back to the
debtor and levy upon the land and sell

it in satisfaction of

the judgment without giving any notice to the debtor or the
debtor's grantee, the United States Supreme Court held
the coae section was constitutional.

In so doing, the court

stated:
The contention that this section is unconstitutional,
as applied to such a purchaser [from the grantor-debtor]
rests, in the last analysis, upon the claim that he
is entitled, as a matter of right, in accordance with
settled usage and established principles of law, to
notice of a proceeding, to sell the land under the
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that

prior security deed and opportunity to make defense
therein. We cannot sustain this contention.
Scott v. Paisley, 271 U.S. 632, 634

(U.S. 1926).

The Court

went on to state:
In the absence of a specific provision 'to that effect
[that the holder of a mortgage or trust deed must
give notice to a subsequent purchaser], the holder
of a mortgage or trust deed with power of sale, is
not required to give notice of the exercise of the
power to a subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer; and
the validity of the sale is not affected by the fact
that such notice is not given. . . . And it Watkins
v. Booth, supra, 94, the court said that it was the
duty of the subsequent lienor "to keep advised as
to proceeding in case of the former trust deed."
Id. at 635, 636.

In a later case, a California court reached

a similar conclusion in a suit to have a sale under a deed of
trust declared invalid.

In refusing to declare the sale invalid,

the court stated:
Appellants' major contention appears to be that since
the original trustors were entitled %o have notice
of sale mailed to them at their address as given in
the trust deed, and since the beneficiary had been
notified of appellant's acquisition of the property,
and of appellants' address, appellant, as successor
in interest to the original trustors, was entitled
"to specific notice under Section 2924b of the Civil
Code."
This contention is untenable. . . . So, a
purchaser of land on which there is a prior security
deed acquires his interest in the property subject
to the right of the holder of the secured debt to
exercise the statutory power of sale. There is no
established principle of law which entitles such a
purchaser to notice of the exercise of the power.
Lancaster

Security

Investment Corp. v. Kessler, 324 P.2d 634,

636, 638 (Cal. App. 2d 1958i.
Goodwills argue at page 10 of their brief that Butlers
could have notified the Goodwills of Cornwells' default.
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While

it may have been possible for the Butlers to learn of the Goodwills'
interest in the property, the courts, as the above-cited
make clear, have held that it was Goodwills'

cases

responsibility

to seek out Butlers to determine the status of their assignors'
(Cortiwells' ) compliance with the terms of the contract.
While the courts could have required the vendors (Butlers)
to give notice to the purchasers' assignee

(Goodwills), they

chose not to do so for a very good, common sense reason.
had no knowledge of the Goodwills' interest

Butlers

in the property

and no economic incentive to check with the Weber County Recorders
Office to detemine if their defaulting purchasers had
their

interest to another.

assigned

For them to have checked with the

Recorders Office would have been extraordinary.
Yet for the Goodwills to have checked the status of
their assignor's interest in the property upon which they were
about to loan $38,000 with the Weber County Recorders Office
and so find Butlers' names and address, would have been very
ordinary.

They had every economic

fact, it is precisely

incentive to do so.

the kind of behavior

from a reasonable, prudent businessman.

one would

In

expect

Had Goodwills made

such a check, they would have discovered not only Butlers' names,
address and interest in the prop^Lty, they would have uj.scovei.ed
that their assignors

(Cornwells) had previously assigned

their

interest in the contract to Clearfield State Bank.
B.

Goodwills' Argument That Notice By

Is Constitutionally Insufficient Is Mere Surplusage.
18

Publication

At page 12 in their brief, Goodwills state:
The Dirks further argue that the Notice of Foreclosure
was published, and that, accordingly, the Goodwills
were constructively served with notice. We submit
that even notice by publication is constitutionally
insufficient.
Dirks never made any such argument.

Such an argument

would have been inappropriate to make for two reasons.

First,

as noted above, there was no foreclosure involved in this case.
The Butlers repossessed their property

in accordance with the

provisions of a Uniform Real Estate Contract.
62, 64.

Record at 59,

Second, the Butlers were unaware of the Goodwills and

their interest in the property until well after they had repossessed
the property.

Record at 60.

Goodwills seem to be setting up

a straw-man argument in order to knock it down.
The cases cited by Goodwills on pages 14 and 15 of their
brief for the proposition that powers of sale in real estate
contracts, mortgages and trust deeds have been critically questioned
because of the Due Process Clause are so different

from the

case at bar that they have little value as precedent.

It should

be noted that none of the cases are from Utah, the Federal District
Court for Utah or the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
main

issue in Law v. United

The

States Department of Agriculture,

366 F.Supp. 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1973), v;as the validity of the waiver
of plaintiff's due process rights of prior notice.

There is

no such issue of waiver of the right to notice in the case at
bar.
P.2d

Valley Development at Vail v. Warder, City of Eagle, 557
1180 (Colo. 1976) involved
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the validity of a court-held

summary ex parte foreclosure hearing wherein the court limited
the subject matter of the hearing to the question of the debtor's
military status.

There was nothing

like a summary ex parte

foreclosure hearing involved in the instant case.
Neither do the other

two cases cited by

Goodwills

in this section bear a close factual relationship to the case
at bar.

In Ricker v. United States, 417 F.Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976)

government action was involved because a federal employee initiated
and carried out a foreclosure

sale of the mortgagor's

farm.

In our case, there was absolutely no state or government action
involved

in Butlers' repossession of the property under the

terms of their Uniform Real Estate Contract.
National

Mortgage

Association

Finally, in Federal

v. B e a r d ,

659

(Kan. Ct. App. 1983), where a mortgage was being

P.2d

232

foreclosed

and an attempt at personal service on the defendant was unsuccessful,
the critical consideration was the distinction between knowledge
of the defendants' mailing address, which the plaintiff had,
and knowledge of the defendants' residence, which the plaintiff
did not have.

Obviously, the case at bar bears little resemblance

to Beard since it involves a repossession under a Uniform Real
Estate Contract, not a foreclosure proceeding, and the Butlers
had no knowledge of either Goodwills' residence or mailing address
when the repossession took place.

Record at 59, 60.

It is apparent from the applicable case law that this
Court should affirm the lower court's order granting
Judgment to the Plaintiffs-Respondents.
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Summary

There are two Utah

cases, Jeffs, v. Citizens Finance Company, supra, and Wiscombe
v. The Lockhart Company, supra, the facts of which are virtually
the same as the facts in the instant case, wherein this Court
has determined that it is up to the purchaser's assignee

(the

Goodwills) of a real estate contract to seek out and notify
the vendor

(the Butlers) and determine their assignors' rights

and obligations so that the assignee can arrange to assume the
contract in the event the purchaser defaults in his obligations
under the real estate contract.

Other state supreme courts

have reached the same conclusion.

This the Goodwills did not

do.

These courts also argue that the recording of the assignee's

interest

in the property does not give constructive notice to

the vendor of the subsequent
United

interest

in the property.

The

States Supreme Court in Scott v. Paisley, supra, and

a California

appeals court in Lancaster Security

Investment

Corp. v. Kessler, supra, have held in analagous situations that
junior

lien holders' rights can be cut off without notice.

Goodwills have cited no cases similar to the one at bar which
have held that it was Butlers' duty to seek out Goodwills, who
they did not know and had no reason to know, and give them notice
of their assignors' default.
POINT II
UTAH f S FORECLOSURE AND QUIET TITLE PROCEDURES DO NOT
CONSTITUTE STATE ACTION FOR FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE
PROCESS PURPOSES.
A.

The Fourteenth Amendment Applies To State Action,

Not To Private Action.
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The D e f e n d a n t s '

contention

that

the 14th Amendment's

Due Process c l a u s e r e q u i r e s t h a t they be given n o t i c e of B u t l e r s '
intention

to

has no b a s i s .

repossess
The f i r s t

the property after
section

of

t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n
[N]or s h a l l any S t a t e
l i b e r t y , or p r o p e r t y ,
nor deny t o any p e r s o n
equal p r o t e c t i o n of the
Thus,

from a p l a i n

Cornwells

defaulted

the Fourteenth

Amendment

states:

d e p r i v e any p e r s o n of l i f e ,
w i t h o u t due p r o c e s s of law;
within i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n the
laws.
(Emphasis added.)

reading

of

this

p o r t i o n of the

Fourteenth

Amendment, i t i s a p p a r e n t t h a t i t i s the s t a t e which i s p r o h i b i t e d
from d e p r i v i n g persons of p r o p e r t y without due p r o c e s s
The U n i t e d
state

State?s Supreme Court and numerous o t h e r

courts

(U.S. 1948);

have

so h e l d .

Jackson

Shelley

v. Metropolitan

1229

Agricultural
Allied

(8th C i r .

1980);

S h e e t Metal

Fabricators

law.
and

334 U . S . 1

Edison C o . , 419 U.S. 345

Neidner

and Power D i s t r i c t ,

federal

v . Kraemer,

(U.S. 1974); Warren v . Government N a t i o n a l Mortgage
611 F.2d

of

Association,

v . S a l t River

590 P.2d

v. Peoples

447

(Ariz.

National

Project
1979);

Bank,

518

P.2d 734 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
These cases make clear that it is a firmly established
principle of our judicial system

that the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment can only be invoked when a state
takes action to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.

The Defendants acknowledged this

fact in their brief at pages 4 and 5.
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B.

There Was Absolutely

No State Action

Involved

In The Case At Bar,
The courts have provided

us with guidelines to help

us determine how closely involved a state must be with an event
before state involvement becomes "state action" for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals

stated

in a recent case:
In short, the party seeking to establish that action
of a private party violated the Constitution must
be able to point to the specific act or actions of
the government which in fact motivated the private
action.
Gerena v. Puerto Rico Legal Servicesy
(1st Cir. 1983).

Inc., 697 F.2d 447, 450

In an earlier case, the United States Supreme

Court found that it was not possible to generalize about when
private action constituted state action.

it stated:

Owing to the very "largeness" of the government, a
multitude of relationships might appear to some to
fall within the [Fourteenth] Amendment's embrace,
but that, it must be remembered, can be determined
only in the framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances present.
Burton v. Wilmington

Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725-726

(U.S. 1961).
What "specific acts or actions of the government",
Gerena, supra, "in the framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances," Burton, Id., of the case at bar have Goodwills pointed
to which motivated

Butlers to repossess ! the property without

informing the Goodwills?

None.

There was absolutely no state action involved.
the Butlers, the plaintiffs1 grantors, entered and
23

Here

repossessed

the property

in question after the Cornwellsf the defendants'

assignors, defaulted.

They did so in accordance with the provisions

of a private contract, a Uniform Real Estate Contract.

There

were no state officials involved nor was it done under the provisions
of any particular state statute.

It was a private action carried

out between private citizens under the terms of a private contract.
Since there was absolutely no state action involved in the repossession of the property, the defendants cannot call upon the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to support their claim
that they were entitled to notice and a hearing before the Butlers
repossessed the property.
As a federal district

court stated

in a 1979 case

involving the distraint of property under the terms of a commercial
lease:
This is a commercial lease and nowhere is unconscionability
or inequality of bargaining power alleged. Consequently,
the parties are bound by the clear contract language
which allowed the landlord the right to distraint
for unpaid rent. A remedy devised by private parties
and executed without the help of public officials
does not constitute state action. It is "well settled
that the fourteenth amendment applies only to actions
of the 'state' and not to actions which are 'private'."
(Emphasis added.)
SMI Industries, Inc. v. Lanard & Axilbund, Inc., 481 F.Supp. 459,
461-462 (E.D. Pa 1979) quoting Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107,
1110 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1039, 95 S.Ct. 526,
4 2 L.Ed.2d 316.
C.

The Use Of The Courts To Enforce Private Agreements

Not Involving Racial Discrimination
Fourteenth Amendment Purposes.
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Is Not State Action For

The Goodwills claim at page 6 in their brief

that

the use of the courts as "the final step of quieting title"
is sufficient state involvement to constitute state action for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes and so to extend the Due Process
requirements to the private agreement between Butlers and Cornwells.
Their main support for this proposition

is the United

States

Supreme Court decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, 3 34 U.S. 1 (U. S. 1948).
While

a superficial

reading

of Shelley

v. Kraemer

may lead one to believe that the Supreme Court held that any
use of the courts to enforce a private agreement brought that
agreement within the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
a more careful analysis of the case reveals that the Court's
holding was much more limited than that and!f in fact, does not
bring the judicial enforcement of a private agreement such as
the one at bar, within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It must be noted that in Shelley v. Kraemer, the private agreement
in question was a restrictive covenant that prohibited
of the property
race.

the use

involved to any person not of the Caucasian

This covenant was broken by private parties.
On August 11, 1945, pursuant to a contract of sale,
petitioners Shelley, who are Negroes, for valuable
consideration received from one Fitzgerald a warranty
deed to the parcel in question.

Icl. at 5.
It was another owner of property subject to the covenants
who brought the suit to have the covenants enforced by restraining
Shelleys from taking possession of the property and by divesting
them of title to the property.

The trial court denied the requested
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relief on the ground

that the restrictive agreement had never

become effective because it had not been signed, as
by all property owners in the district.

intended,

It was in this posture

that the case went to the Supreme Court of Missouri, i.e., with
the Negroes Shelley holding title to the property and occupying
it under the terms of a private sale.
The Supreme Court of Missouri sitting en banc reversed
and directed the trial court to grant the relief for
which respondents had prayed.
That court held the
[restrictive covenant] agreement effective and concluded
that enforcement of its provisions violated no rights
guaranteed to petitioners by the Federal Constitution.
At the time the court rendered its decision, petitioners
were occupying the property in question.
Id. at 6.
It is apparent, then, that without the positive action
of the Missouri Supreme Court, the Negroes Shelley would have
had title to, and possession of, the property despite the restrictive
covenants.

It was this positive action by the Missouri Supreme

Court to which the United States Supreme Court particularly
objected.

It stated:

We have no doubt that there has been state action
in these cases [a second case with similar facts was
decided at the same time] in the full and complete
sense of the phrase. The undisputed facts disclose
that petitioners were willing purchasers of properties
upon which they desired to establish homes. The owners
of the properties were willing sellers; and contracts
of sale were accordingly consummated.
It is clear
•chat out for the active intervention of the state
courts, supported by the full panoply of state power,
petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties
in question without restraint. (Emphasis added)
Id. at 19.
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Besides

this positive

impact of the state

court's

action on the status quo, another reason that the Supreme Court
in Shelley v. Kraemer found state action for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes was the fact that the case involved racial discrimination,
the prevention of which was the precise reason for the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Several federal courts have acknow-

ledged the fact that when racial discrimination

is present in

a case, it takes less state involvement to constitute state
action and so invokes the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In a 1974 case involving an action brought under the
Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment, a car buyer alleged
that state action was present when the cai: dealer resorted to
self-help repossession which was permitted in the contract between
the parties.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the

United States District Court's dismissal

of the suit.

In so

doing, the court stated:
We are likewise pursuaded that Reitman [Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (U.S. 1967), which invalidated a California
constitutional provision that permitted racial discrimination in housing] cannot be relied upon to justify
a finding of state action here. Our opinion in Palmer
notwithstanding, 479 F. 2d 153 (6th Cir. 1 9 7 3 ) , we
view Reitman as dealing with a state attempt to accomplish
indirectly what it was prohibited from doing directly.
We cannot ignore the fact that the context of onerous
racial discrimination in which the case was set demanded
special scrutiny. The injustices of racial discrimination
cast a different shadow than that of the case before
us.
(Citation omitted) (Emphasis added).
Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 611 (6th Cir. 1974).
The United States District Court for Nebraska expressed
a similar sentiment in an earlier case which involved the question
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of whether

self-help repossession of an automobile under the

terms of the Nebraska Commercial Code constituted state action
so as to allow the plaintiff to invoke the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In dismissing the action for lack

of jurisdiction, the court stated:
It must also be remembered that such cases as Reitman
grew out of the pervasive evil of racial discrimination,
which demands peculiarly stringent procedures for
erad icat i on.
No racial considerations infest the
present case, (Emphasis added).
Pease v. Havelock, 351 F.Supp. 118, 121 (D. Neb. 1972).
In another case which involved the question of whether
or not state action was involved in a private university's denial
of employment to two women, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized the fact that a lesser amount of state
is needed

involvement

to find state action in racial discrimination cases

than in non-racial discrimination cases.

It stated:

Moreover we have recognized the existence of a "double
standard11 in state action—"one, a less onerous test
for cases involving racial discrimination, and a more
rigorous standard for other claims," Jackson v. The
Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d. Cir. 1974). . . ;
Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397, 405 (2d. Cir. 1975).
At least two courts have refused to find that a court's
acting in its judicial capacity as an impartial arbiter to settle
disputes constituted state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
In a 1975 case, the Supreme Court of Missouri was called
to determine

upon

if a lower court's upholding of the validity of

a trust which included provisions that the income from the trust
be used to support Protestant Hospitals

28

for the support and

care of sick and

infirm white patients was constitutional.

In upholding the validity of the trust despite the racial and
religious overtones, the Court refused to categorize the lower
court's participation in the case as state action for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes.

The court stated:

Under the facts of this case, "state action" was not
involved in the creation of the trust, nor is it required
to carry out its terms. Mr. McWilliams was a private
individual, and the corpus of his trust derived solely
from his private funds. The trustee is a privately
owned bank and it selects beneficiaries in each class
in an exercise of unlimited discretion. . . .
Nor has the court in construing this trust engaged
in "sponsoring," "promoting," or "enforcing" discrimination, as in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, and Barrows
v. Jackson, supra, where the court was asked to rule
[sic] the legality of a restrictive covenant prohibiting
real estate sales to blacks, and to implement the
holding by affirmative judicial action such as ouster
from possession of the black owner or granting a money
judgment and execution. . . .
If appellants1 arguments were sustained, then no transfer
of property by will to a religious institution or
to a person of a designated race could be valid if
a construction of the will's provisions became necessary.
Such is not an indicated result under the law. (Emphasis
added).
First National Bank of Kansas City v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808,
821 (Mo. 1975 ) , reh'g or transfer

to court en banc denied,

cert, denied 95 S. Ct. 1999, 2424 (1975).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar
determination in a case involving a complaint by a tenant alleging
her eviction from an apartment building which had received federal
benefits in the form of mortgage insurance under the National
Housing Act was without due process procedures.
to find any state action involved and statedi
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The court failed

Neither, despite some language in Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948)
can state action be found in New York providing defendant
with the same right to secure eviction of a tenant
by a proceeding in its courts that it gives to all
landlords; the one thing now almost universally agreed
is that such a rationale for that landmark decision
would be altogether too far-reaching.
McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc. , 431 F.2d 1189, 1190 (2nd Cir. 1970) .
Since there

is no racial discrimination

involved in

the case at bar and the lower court was not asked to take any
positive action to enforce discrimination, the two preconditions
for finding state action due to the court's

involvement

not present as they were in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra.

Therefore,

this Court must find that merely using the state court
as a neutral arbiter

are

system

to settle disputes among private parties

does not constitute state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
If the use of the courts to settle disputes over private
real estate contracts or foreclosure proceedings were

found

to be state action, then the distinction between state action
and private action as set forth over 100 years ago, and by which
the judiciary has been guided since then, would be obliterated.
Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 27 L.Ed. 835, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883),
the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action
as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That
Amendment erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrong.
Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, at 13.
D.

The Existence Of State Statutes Which

Regulate

The Enforcement Of Private Agreements Does Not Constitute State
Action For Fourteenth Amendment Purposes.
30

Goodwills contend on page 6 of their brief that state
action is present in the case at bar becuase the state has provided
"facilities, services and extensive regulation which assist
in foreclosure of a private agreement."
contention, they offer

As support

for this

four court decisions plus the fact of

the existence of several Utah Code sections dealing with real
property.
This Court must reject this contention

for several

reasons. First of all, as noted above, there has been no foreclosure
proceeding involved in this case.
merely repossessed

The Butlers, as private parties,

their property

from other private parties

under the terms of a private agreement.

There was no involvement

of a sheriff or a court clerk or any other state official, nor
was there reliance on any statute.

The only involvement of

the state at all was through its provision of a court

system

which has been called upon to act as a neutral arbitor to settle
this dispute.

The reasons why the involvement of the courts

in this fashion does not constitute state action for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes was discussed

in the preceeding

section.

Second, even if the existence of foreclosure statutes
is considered applicable to the instant case by analogy, when
analyzed

carefully, the four cases relied on by Goodwills do

not support the proposition that the state involvement

in the

case at bar is sufficient to constitute state action for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes.

The first case relied

upon here by the

Goodwills is Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
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(U.S. 1961).

It was an action by a black for declaratory and

injunctive relief against a restaurant located within an off-street
parking building owned and operated by the Wilmington Parking
Authority, an agency

of the State of Delaware.

The restaurant,

the lessee of the Wilmington Parking Authority, refused to serve
the black food or drink solely because of his race.
A main issue in the case was whether the restaurant's
refusal of service to the black was private action and so beyond
the reach of the Fourteenth
subject to the Amendment.
the Court outlined
restaurant.

Amendment or state action and so

In finding that it was state action,

the extensive state involvement with the

It stated,

The land and building were publicly owned.
As an
entity, the building was dedicated to "public uses"
in performance of the Authority's "essential governmental
functions."
22 Del. Code, Sections 501, 514. The
cost of land acquisition, construction, and maintenance
are defrayed entirely from donations by the City of
Wilmington, from loans and revenue bonds and from
the proceeds of rentals and parking services out of
which the loans and bonds were payable. . . . [T]he
commercially leased areas were not surplus state property,
but constituted a physically and financially integral,
and, indeed, indespensable part of the State's plan
to operate its project as a self-sustaining unit.
Upkeep and maintenance of the building, including
necessary repairs, were responsibilities of the Authority
and were payable out of public funds.
It cannot be
doubted that the peculiar relationship of the restaurant
to the parking facility in which it is located confers
on each an incidental variety of mutual benefits. . . .
Addition o£ all ot these activities and responsibilities
of the Authority, the benefits mutuallly con ferred,
to geth er with the obvious fact that the resitaurant
is ope rated as an integral P<art of a publ ic building
de vote d to a publ;ic parking service, indicates the
de gree of state participation and involvement in discr iminatory actior[ which it was\ t h e des ign of the
Fourteenth Amendment to condemn. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 723-724.
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In contrast to the extensive state involvement which
the Court found existed

in Burton, in thd case at bar, there

was no state involvement.

The Butlers acted as private parties

to repossess their property from other private parties under
the terms of a private agreement without the assistance or involvement of any state officials.

Therefore, the finding of state

involvement for Fourteenth Amendment purposes by the Court in
Burton does not dictate a similar finding by this Court in the
instant case.

In fact, the Court

in Burton went out of the

way to limit the impact of its holding.

It ^tated:

Specifically defining the limits of our inquiry, what
we hold today is that when a State leases public property
in the manner and for the purpose shown to have been
the case here, the proscriptions of the Fourteenth
Amendment must be complied with by the lessee as certainly
as though they were binding covenants written into
the agreement itself.
Id. at 726.
It should also be noted that Burton was a case involving
racial discrimination whereas in the instant case there is no
such discrimination

involved.

In the previously cited case

of Weise v. Syracuse University, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals found this difference significant.

it stated:

As the conduct complained of becomes more offensive,
and as the nature of the dispute becomes more amenable
to resolution by a court, the more jappropriate it
is to subject the issue to judicial scrutiny.
This
explains the willingness to find state action in racial
discrimination cases although the same state-private
relationship might not trigger such a finding in a
case involving a different dispute over a different
interest.
Supra, at 406.
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The Goodwills next rely on the case of Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (U.S. 1967), for the proposition that the existence
of statutes providing for Quiet Title Actions and for extensive
property regulation amounts to state encouragement

of the use

of these statutes which constitutes state action for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes.
Upon close analysis, it is apparent that the findings
in Reitman are not applicable to the case at bar.

That case

involved two actions wherein two couples sued apartment owners
for racial discrimination, in one case for refusing
an apartment and in the other one for eviction.

to rent

These actions

required an interpretation of the constitutionality of a recent
California

initiative which amended the state constitution to

prohibit the state from interfering

in an owner's decision to

sell, lease or rent his property to anyone he chose.

The California

Supreme Court found that this provision violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it allowed racial
discrimination.
In affirming the California Supreme Court's decision,
the United States Supreme Court stated:
[T] he State has taken affirmative action designed
to make private discrimination legally possible.
Section 26 [the amended section] was said [by the
California Supreme Court] to have changed the situation
from one in which discrimination was restricted "to
one wherein it is encouraged, within the meaning of
the cited decisions";
Section 26 was legislative
action "which authorized private discrimination" and
made the State "at least a partner in the instant
act of discrimination". . . . Here we are dealing
with a provision which does not just repeal an existing
law forbidding racial discrimination.
Section 26
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was intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial
discrimination in the housing market. The right to
discriminate is now one of the basic policies of the
Sta.te.
Supra, at 375, 380-381.
It seems apparent that the existenc^ of statutes authorizing Quiet Title Actions and regulating propjerty is not positive
state encouragement for private parties to repossess their property
without providing

notice

in the same sense that the passage

of the constitutional amendment forbidding state interference
with the decisions of owners of property to decline to sell,
lease or rent to any person was positive state encouragement
for private racial discrimination.
Therefore, the fact that the Supreme Court found state
action

in Reitman does not mandate that this Court find state

action

in the instant case.

This is especially true when it

is noted that Reitman involved racial discrimination, the very
reason for the existence of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Several federal courts have refused to apply Reitman
to cases that did not involve racial discririiination.
which

involved an automobile dealer's attempted

In a case

repossession

of a used car by self-help methods under a state statute, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the existence of the
statute did not involve sufficient state action to confer federal
jurisdiction

under the Civil Rights Act.

In so holding, the

court stated:
The outer boundaries of "imputed" state actions have
been charted primarily in race discrimination cases.
We are unwilling to push out the frontier still farther
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in a case devoid of racial overtones. The same consideration compels us to reject appellee's argument based
on Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct. 1627,
18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1966). There again racial discrimination
was involved. Moreover, the indicia of state involvement
were much stronger, because, as the opinion made clear,
the purpose of the challenged state constitutional
amendment was to authorize private discrimination
in the transfer of real property where before it had
been barred by statute.
James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1974).
In a class action suit filed under the Civil Rights
Act, the plaintiffs based

their complaint on the claim

that

self-help repossession of automobiles subject to security interests
were invalid.

The federal district court found certain provisions

of the state motor vehicle code invalid, but the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed because it found no state action and,
therefore, no cause of action had been alleged under the Civil
Rights Statute.

In so doing, it stated:

Nor do we find in the statutory scheme the kind of
encouragement and fosterage of the alleged unconstitutional
act as in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct. 1627,
18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967). In Reitman, the State constitutional amendment repealed prior state legislation
regulating racial discrimination in housing. Thus,
in effect, the state constitutionally authorized discrimination by repealing prior law and by substantially
inhibiting any subsequent change. The case before
us is vastly dissimilar to the situation in Reitman.
Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 1111 (3rd Cir. 1974).
Based

upon the authority of the above-cited cases,

this Court should

refuse to extend

the rationale of Reitman

to the case at bar which does not involve racial discrimination.
Goodwills next cite Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage
Association, 372 F.Supp. 594

(E.D. Mich. 1974) as support for

their contention that the existence of state statutes allowing
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Quiet Title Actions and regulating property id state encouragement
of repossession procedures followed by Butlers and so is state
action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.

This case involved

the contention that the existence of statutes regulating

the

foreclosure of mortgages by advertisement was sufficient state
encouragement of the procedure so as to constitute state action
for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
Goodwills1 reliance on this case is misplaced because,
although the federal district court foundi state action, the
decision was reversed on appeal by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.

In reversing, the court stated:

The district court held the foreclosure proceeding
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the
Michigan Constitution of 1963. Because we find no
significant state involvement in the foreclosure proceeding
assailed here, we reverse the judgment of the district
court. . . .
This case differs materially from Reitman.
Judge
Peck, writing for the court in Turner v. Impala Motors,
503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974), said that Reitman "deal [t]
with a state attempt to accomplish indirectly what
it was prohibited from doing directly.
We cannot
ignore the fact that the context of onerous racial
discrimination in which the case was set demanded
special scrutiny".
503 F. 2d at 611. In Turner and
in Gary v. Darnell, 505 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974),
we upheld the Tennessee and Kentucky legislatures 1
implementation of Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which authorizes a secured creditor to peacefully
repossess collateral.
In this case, as in Turner and Gary, we are not concerned
with questions of racial discrimination or state use
of indirect means to accomplish illegal ends. Like
Turner and Gary, this case concerns a idemedy privately
created by contract.
What Judge Peck said in Turner applies as well here:
It is clear that in this case the state did not exert
any control or compulsion over the creditor's decision
to repossess. The private activity was not commanded
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by the simply permissive statute, . . .
We fail to see where the creditor has sought to invoke
any state machinery to its aid. Rather the creditor
has simply relied upon the terms of its security agreement
pursuant to the private right of contract. . . .
We fail to see how the creditor is attempting to enforce
any right in reliance upon a constitutional or statutory
provision as in Reitman or is even asserting any statecreated right. Rather we see a creditor privately
effectuating a right which was created in advance
by contract between the parties. (Emphasis added)
Northrip v. Federal

National Mortgage Association, 527 F•2d

23, 24, 26-28 (6th Cir. 1975).
In the case at bar just as in the above cited case,
the Butlers were not relying

on any statutory provision but

were "privately effectuating a right which was created in advance
by contract between the parties,"

_^d*i when they repossessed

their property from the Cornwells.

Therefore, this Court must

likewise find there was no state action for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes involved in the instant case.
Finally, Goodwills
Company, Inc. , 457 U.S. 922

rely on Lugar v. Edmondson

Oil

(U.S. 1982), as support for their

contention that state action exists in the case at bar.

Lugar

involved a situation wherein a supplier of the lessee-operator
of a truck stop sued in state court for the debt owed it.

Ancillary

to that action and pursuant to state law, the supplier

sought

prejudgment attachment of some of the operator's property.
Although the United States Supreme Court found state
action

in Lugar, the holding seems narrowly drawn.

The Court

stated:
The prejudgment attachment procedure required only
that Edmondson allege, in an ex parte petition, a
belief that petitioner was disposing of or might dispose
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of his property in order to defeat his creditors.
Acting upon that petition, a Clerk of the state court
issued a writ of attachment, which was then executed
by the County Sheriff. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 924.

The court went on to state:

Whatever may be true in other contexts, this is sufficient
[invoking the aid of state off icials] when the State
has created a system whereby state officials will
a t t c ach propert y on th e ex parte app lication o f one
party to a private dispute (Emphasis added.)
.Id. at 942.
It seems clear from the underlined language that the
Court based

its decision

in Lugar not upon the existence of

a statutory scheme which regulated

property and provided

for

court settlement of private disputes, but upon the existence
of a statutory scheme whereby state officials, a court clerk
and a county sheriff, attached property upon the ex parte application
of one party to a private dispute.

Since

in the case at bar

there was no ex parte application and no court clerk, county
sheriff or any other state official involved in Butler's private
repossession of their property from the other private parties
under the terms of a private contract, Lugar does not mandate
the finding that the existence of state statutes allowing Quiet
Title Actions and providing for the regulation of property is
state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposds.
Three separate state supreme courts have refused to
find state action in situations analogous to the instant case.
In a 1975 case involving a foreclosure proceeding under a power
of sale, the complaint attacked the constitutionality of various
sections of state statutes because they failed to provide for
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard.
3^

The Supreme Court

of Georgia rejected these attacks, stating:
The power of sale may not be utilized except under
the provisions of a contract and if exercised the
statute provides the manner in which such power is
to be exercised. It is a purely contractual matter
between two parties in the exercise of private property
rights.
There is insufficient meaningful government
involvement to constitute state action by the mere
adoption of statutes providing for the sale of real
estate under powers contained in mortgages, debts,
deeds or other lien contracts where the grant of such
power is contained in the contract between the parties
thereto. No government official or agency is involved
in such process. (Emphasis added).
Coffey Enterprises Realty and Development Company, Inc. v. Holmes,
213 S.E.2d 882, 884 (Ga. 1975).
The Supreme Court of Missouri

sitting en banc also

refused to find state action in a case that involved the foreclosure
of a deed of trust pursuant to a power of sale.

In so doing,

the Court stated:
In Federal National Mortgage Association v. Howlett,
521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. Banc 1975) this court was presented
with the issue of whether the statutory provisions
relating to the foreclosure of deeds of trust under
a power of sale are unconstitutional on the basis
that they violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth.
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Section 10 of the Missouri Constitution. The same
basic issue is presented again in this case. . . .
We also held in Howlett that the fact that the statutory
provisions relating to extrajudicial foreclosure recognize
and authorize, and thus possibly encourage, use of
the procedure authorized by contract, or the fact
that a purchaser at such a foreclosure sale may use •
the state courts to enforce righis to possession thereby
acquired, does not render the foreclosure proceedings
such significant "state action" as is required to
make the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause applicable, i
The Fourteenth Amendment questions presented in this
case are essentially the same as those presented in
Howlett.
The holding in Howlett that extrajudicial
foreclosure which has been authorized by agreement
expressed in the security instrument does not involve
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significant state action, notwithstanding applicable
statutory provisions, supplies the answers to all
of defendants1 Fourteenth Amendment due process questions.
The foreclosure of the deed of trust on defendants 1
property was pursuant to a power expressly granted
by that instrument and not to any power authorized
or encouraged by state law. (Emphasis added).
Federal National Mortgage Association v. Scojtt, 548 S.W.2d 545,
548-549 (Mo. 1977).
Finally, the Michigan Supreme Court also refused to
find state action in a case wherein
accelerated

the mortgagor's debt was

and his property sold by the mortgagee under the

terms of their contract.

The Court stated:

The essence of plaintiff's constitutional argument
is that the foreclosure statute grants a mortgagee
the power to terminate a mortgage relationship by
use of procedures that are not in harmony with the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment^ to the United
States Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the
Michigan Constitution. Specifically, she claims that
the Mighican foreclosure by advertisement statute,
as applied, violated the due process clauses of the
two constitutions in that it requires neither a notice
of hearing, nor a hearing to establish tjie debt. . . .
Since the power of sale is an incident of the private
right to contract, [citation omitted], a mortgagee
who exercises a foreclosure option is relying on a
contract remedy, and not on a right created by statute.
[Sic] 527 F.2d 26-27.
Therefore, the state cannot
be said to be significantly involved, through "encouragement," in the challenged conduct, and a due process
question is consequently not presented. . . .
Accordingly, we hold that the plaintiff's instant
claim of unconstitutionality under both the Michigan
and Federal Constitution fails for lack of the existence
of state action.
Cramer v. Metropolitan Savings and Loan Association, 258 N.W.2d
20, 22-23 (Mich. 1977).
In a previously cited case involving a car buyer who
brought an action against a car dealer for resorting to self-help
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repossession as permitted
and as allowed

in the contract between the parties

by state statute, the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals refused to find state action.

In so doing, it stated:

This case presents the issue as to whether peaceful
repossession under the Tennessee statute is action
under the color of state law within the meaning of
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and state action within the
meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . .
It is clear that in this case the state did not exert
any control or compulsion over the creditor's decision
to repossess. The private activity was not commanded
by the simply permissive statute. . . .
We fail to see where the creditor has sought to invoke
any state machinery to its aid. Rather, the creditor
has simply relied upon the terms of its security agreement
pursuant to the private right of contract.
(Emphasis
added).
Turner v. Impala Motors, supra, at 608, 611.
In a later case
receiving

involving

a nursing home

federal assistance under the medicaid

resident

program who

was threatened with eviction, a federal district court refused
to find state action.

It stated:

Moreover, the cases also indicate that even the combination
of limited public funding and State regulation does
not transmute private action into state action. . . . At
most the State, by failing to require a hearing prior
to eviction has acquiesced in the private entity's
conduct. The Supreme Court, however, "has never held
that a State's mere acquiescence in a private action
converts that action into that of the State." (Empasis
added).
Wagner v. Sheltz, 471 F.Supp. 903, 908

(D. Conn. 1979) quoting

Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (U.S. 1978).
Thus, it seems clear from the authorities cited that
this Court must find that the mere provision by the State of
Utah of facilities, services and statutes which assist in
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the foreclosure of private agreements does hot constitute state
action

for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.

The Court

should

so find both because each of the four cases relied on by the
Goodwills to support this proposition has been shown to be inapplicable to the case at bar and numerous other authorities have
been cited which have held
provision of similar

in analagous Situations

that the

facilities, services and statutes by the

state is insufficient state involvement

in a right created by

a private agreement to constitute state action for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes.
If this Court were to find otherwise, that distinction
articulated

in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (U.S. 1883),

between state action which

is subject to the prohibitions of

the Fourteenth Amendment and private action which is not would
be blurred beyond recognition.
their concern

Several courts have articulated

that under such a holding v irtually all private

action would become state action:
Virtually all formal private arrangements assume,
at some point, the supportive role of the state.
To hold that the state, by recognizing the legal effect
of those arrangements, converts them into state acts
for constitutional purposes would effectively erase
to a significant extent the constitutional line between
private and state action and subject to judicial scrutiny
under the Fourteenth Amendment virtually all private
arrangements that purport to have binding legal effect.
Garfinkle v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 578 P.2d
925,

932

(Cal. 1978), quoting Berrera v. Security Building and

Investment Corporation, 519 F.2d 1166, 1170 ^5th Cir. 1975).
The Court finds little significance ±rfi the fact that
a clerk may perform the ministerial act of recording
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the deed under power evidencing sale or that the courts
of the State of Georgia may enforce the agreements
the parties have made. Were these factors considered
determinative, every private agreement between citizens
would be imbued with state action.
Global

Industries,

Inc. v. Harris, 376 F.Supp. 1379, 1383

(N.D. Ga. 1974).
Similarly, if it is to be said that any act by an
individual is state action if the state's law permits
it, almost every act by an individual becomes state
action. Such long-settled rights of private property
as possessory liens of every type would be subject
to being swept away, because of the inability to give
notice and to hold a hearing prior to the holding
of possession.
Pease v. Havelock National Bank, supra, at 121.
At least an aspect of appellees' argument, distilled
to its essense, is that when a state attempts to comprehensively regulate on area of private conduct, its
failure to prohibit is equivalent to "state action."
Such a rule, however, would virtually obliterate the
distinction between state and private action.
As
the Ninth Circuit noted in Adams v. Southern California
First National Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 330-331 (9th Cir. 1973):
"Statutes and laws regulate many forms of purely private
activity, such as contractual relations and gifts,
and subjecting all behavior that conforms to state
law to the Fourteenth Amendment would emasculate the
state action concept. . . .
If we were to accept
the debtors' broad test, it would be very difficult
to draw any line between state and private action."
(Emphasis added.)
Gibbs v. Titelman, supra, at 1112.
This Court, too, must refuse "to obliterate the distinction
between state and private action" in the instant case.
CONCLUSION
In the case at bar, the Plaintiffs-Respondents' grantors,
private parties, repossessed

their property under the terms

of their private contract with other private parties and without
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the assistance of any state officials and without relying on
any state statute.

The Defendants-Appellants contend that this

action violated their Fourteenth

Amendment due process right

to notice and a hearing because somehow state action was involved.
This Court must reject Defendants-Appellants1 argument
and affirm the lower court's order granting
to the Plaintiffs-Respondents

Summary

for several reasons.

Judgment
First, to

do so would follow the precedent set by this Court and other
state supreme courts in cases involving very similar fact patterns.
Second, the United States Supreme Court and a California
court have held in an analagous situation that junior lien holder's
rights can be cut off without notice.
Third,

the Fourteenth

Amendment

is not

applicable

to the case at bar because there was absolutely no state action
involved

in Butlers' repossession of their property under the

terms of their private contract.

Virtually all of the cases

cited by Defendants-Appellants Goodwills as support for their
contention involved racial discrimination, a particular concern
of the Fourteenth Amendment and one which requires lesser state
involvement for a finding of state action

than do cases such

as the one at bar where no racial discrimination is involved.
Fourth, numerous authorities have held that the mere
existence of state statutes and the availability of courts as
j
neutral arbitors to settle disputes do not constitute such state
involvement in private disputes as to constitute
for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
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state action

Finally, if the Court were to find that state action
is present

in the case at bar, that distinction

by the United

articulated

States Supreme Court over 100 years ago between

private action and state action would be hopelessly
leading to more and more

blurred,

involvement of the government into

the private contracts and lives of individual citizens.
Therefore, it is respectfully
Court affirm the order of the Second

requested

that

this

Judicial District Court

granting Summary Judgment to the Plaintiffs-Respondents,
RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED

this X /^f- day of February,

1985.

*K *Sy WARNER/
FRANK
3LAS/J. HOLMES
DOUGLAS/J.
HOLKES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Darwin Dirks and Jacquelyn Dirks
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CERTIFICATE OF BAILING
I hereby certify that on this 0f^Jr

day of February,

1985, I deposited for mailing in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid,
four true and correct copies of the foregoing to EARL S. SPAFFORD
and LYNN C. SPAFFORD, Spafford, Dibb, Duffin and Jensen, attorneys
for Defendants-Appellants Wilf ord W. Goodwill and Dorothy P. Goodwill
at 311 South State Street, Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT, IF NOT UNDERSTOOD SEEK OTHER COMPETENT ADVICE."

UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
May
, A. DM 19 79 ,
1. T H I S A G R E E M E N T , made in duplicate this
15th
day o( .
by and between Alma S. Butler and Wanda R« Butler, husband and wife
hereinafter designated a* the Seller, and Paul S, Cornwell and Catherine. If Cormmn, ftuabanri ft wife
as joint tenants with full right of survivorship and not aa tenants in comaon.
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of

________.-_______--—_---__-_.—--________-__-___-——--

2.. W I T N E S S E T H : Thac the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer,
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in
the county of

Weber

_, S t a t e of Utah, to-wit:

More particularly described as follows:

Lot 21, Block 3t Herefordshire Subdivision No. 2, "Planned Residential Development",
Roy City, Weber County, Utah.

3.

Said Buyer hereby agrees to e n t e r into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of .

Seventy-one Thousand and No/lOO

Dollars (f. 71.

payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order .

_

strictly within the following times, to-wit: Siflfat Thousand and No/100 -

( |_

cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of % 6 3 » Q C ' C i Q Q

8.000.00 J

shall be paid as follows:

In monthly installments of $506.92 each month commencing July 1* 1978 said continuing
nonthly thereafter until the principal and the interest are paid in full. In addition
to this monthly figure, there will be an additional $5*000 balloon payment due Nov. 15,
1979* The buyer herein will also deposit with Citizens National ft*wV $55.00 a month
to cover taxes and insurance which will be paid."to. sellers to reimburse them toe-taxes
and -insurance premiums.
. ... If this sua becomes insufficient, the
amount will increase according to the amounts due on tax & insurance.
The Buyer agrees to pay a 5% late charge for any payment made 15 days after due.
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the 4.

15th

May

day of .

19_

Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the

Hfcr 15. 1978

principal. Interest shall be charged from

on all unpaid portions of the
purchase price at the r a t e of P j ; ^ _ J ^ n e - H y ^ f frent ( 9 1 / U
95?) per annum. The Buyer, a t his option at anytime,
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any m o r t g a g e
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in p r e p a y m e n t of future
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made.
5. It is understood and agreed t h a t if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller.
6. It is understood t h a t there presently exists an obligation a g a i n s t said property in favor of
u

Ogden First Federal Savings and Loan Association
as of
April 1, 1978
l+3t$03o6U

with an unpaid balance of

7. Seller represents t h a t there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said premises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said property, except the following
^One
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the
then u n p a i - > : . . : . - c : balance hereunder, bearing t n u . ^ t a. U:e i t s u of not is exceed

I

fli»H

-hr^s

'?nareerfrerCwtt;

( 9 3A,
) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the aggregate monthly installment
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be g r e a t e r than each installment payment required to be
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such
loans and m o r t g a g e s the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property
subject to said loans and m o r t g a g e s .
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this a g r e e m e n t to pay off any obligations o u t s t a n d i n g at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations, P r e p a y m e n t penalties in respect
to obligations a g a i n s t said property incurred by seller, after date of this a g r e e m e n t , shall be paid by seller unless
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer.

11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and n a t u r e which are or which may be assessed
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following:

none

A-l

The Seller further covenants &nd agret. that he will not default in the payment of his oDhgations against said property.
12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after

Haff 15» 1 9 7 8

13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a company acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or $
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may r.ppear and to deliver the insurance policy to him.
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment o/ any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced
and paid by. him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of aaid sums at the rate of % of one percent per
month until paid.
"T3:—Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be •ommitted any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon
said premises, and that he will maintain said prejnises in good condition.
y.
—" 16. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof~5y the Buyer, ofTfpbn failure of the Buyer to make \
""any payment or payments-"wfcen the "same shall become due, or within
<?2
days thereafter, the
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative renifedjea:
~
"_JHZ.
"~~—
1
f- A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of "the Buyer to remedy the default within_±Q_days after written notice,
I
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have
j
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take
(
possession o: 3aid premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with ail improve1
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with
^
the_ land ajid .become .the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgement for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or
C. The Seller shall have the rig-it, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortage, and pass
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing,
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgement for any deficiency which may remain.
In the case of foreclosure, tne Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to
the appointment of a rc-Cfivrr to take possession oi said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and
profits therefrom and ap, ly the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession
of the said premises during the period of redemption.
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement.
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the
same by acts or neglect of tne Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the payments herein provided to be m^t', may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until 3uch a time as such suspended
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid.
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer.
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto .
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State oi Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit
or otherwise.
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year
first above written.
Signed in the presence of
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Buyer
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